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Abstract
Over the past two decades, Chinese involvement in the developing world has
increased dramatically, raising concerns over the intentions behind the provision of
development packages. Critics have accused China of a practice known as debt-trap
diplomacy, a method of ensnaring less developed nations by providing more loans than
those nations have the ability to feasibly pay back. While China denies that their loan and
investment packages are provided with any ulterior motive, the influence held by an
investor like China has the potential to impact these partner countries for decades to
come. In light of the scope of China’s role in the developing world, this project focuses
on two case studies in order to dive deeper into the potential influence generated by
Chinese investment. The case studies are Colombia and Ecuador, each of which allows a
glimpse into Chinese involvement in developing economies in Latin America. Further,
each proves an example as to how such intense investment, such as large infrastructure
loans in Ecuador or newly heavy involvement in the Colombian oil sector, affects the
nations that receive it. Within each country, this paper delves into projects and
development driven by Chinese investment, showcases the level of investment in each
country, and analyzes the influence China stands to gain through its investments. To
understand this influence, this paper draws inspiration from the CIA’s Conceptual
Framework for Analysis of Influence, which looks at the domain, scope, and cost of
influencing another state. This general framework is used to analyze both present
outcomes and future potentials. Overall, this paper finds that Chinese investment in the
case studies does act as a tool by which China can further its policy goals in the region,
but each case presents limitations of that tool.
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Literature Review
Though literature regarding Chinese involvement in Latin America and literature
analyzing Chinese tactics in what some call ‘debt trap’ diplomacy is both plentiful, few
analyses have chosen to examine the role of such tactics within Latin America or the
consequences thereof. The scholarly context has proved key in understanding the Chinese
investment evaluated for this project. Below, works that have shaped this piece are
collected into three general categories: China in Latin America, China and Debt
Diplomacy, and The Unique Position of Chinese Firms and Foreign Investment. The
section covering China in Latin America discusses commercial and political ties and
trends, along with different perspectives on the growth of Chinese involvement in the
region. Next, the pieces in the China and Debt Diplomacy group evaluate China’s use of
debt and loans and the consequences thereof. Finally, the last group looks at the unique
relationship between the Chinese government, Chinese firms, and foreign direct
investment, namely the lack of truly private enterprises in China. This frames the
argument that investment by Chinese firms can and should be considered extensions of
state investment, rather than the classic example of profit-motivated foreign direct
investment. Together, these pieces create the academic framework within which this
project is couched.

Foreign Aid, Loans, and Diplomacy
The connection between aid, investment, and diplomacy is hardly a new
occurrence, nor is it one exclusive to China and the Belt and Road initiative. Since the
1940s, the United States has considered foreign aid to be a key piece to achieving
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America’s political goals overseas.1 For example, Kuziemko and Werker demonstrate
that the United States has long given aid money to the rotating members of the U.N.
Security Council: “On average, the typical developing country serving on the [U.N.
Security] council can anticipate an additional $16 million from the United States and $1
million from the United Nations. During important years, these numbers rise to $45
million from the United States and $8 million from the United Nations.”2 Further, Dreher,
Nunnenkamp, and Thiele propose that the aid correlates with the compliance of those
rotating members on voting within the Security Council: “Accounting for the potential
endogeneity of aid, our results provide strong evidence that US aid has indeed bought
voting compliance. More specifically, the results suggest that general budget support and
grants are the major aid categories with which recipients have been induced to vote in
line with the United States."3
However, the relationship between loans and voting is less clear. Dreher and
Sturm found “Regarding voting coincidence with the United States, World Bank nonconcessional loans have a significant impact, while IMF loans do not.”4 Meanwhile,
Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele found that “Loans have no impact on voting
coincidence at conventional levels of significance.” This is significant because, unlike the

Hendrickson, David C., and Vernon W. Ruttan. “United States Development Assistance Policy: The
Domestic Politics of Foreign Economic Aid.” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 4 (1996): 147.
https://doi.org/10.2307/20047692.
2
Kuziemko, Ilyana, and Eric Werker. “How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid
and Bribery at the United Nations.” Journal of Political Economy 114, no. 5 (2006): 905–30.
https://doi.org/10.1086/507155.
3
Dreher, Axel, Peter Nunnenkamp, and Rainer Thiele. “Does US Aid Buy UN General Assembly Votes? A
Disaggregated Analysis.” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2006. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.910900.
4
Dreher, Axel, and Jan-Egbert Sturm. “Do the IMF and the World Bank Influence Voting in the UN
General Assembly?” Public Choice 151, no. 1-2 (2010): 363–97. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-97502.
1
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United States, most of China’s political investments in developing nations are in the form
of loans. This difference can be seen in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1: Breakdown of Foreign Aid Given by U.S. and China (Billion USD)
Source: AidData.org

In Figure 1 above, the green (ODA) stands for Official Development Assistance and is
what is generally thought of as ‘aid’. It involves more concessional terms, consists of
more than 25% grants, and aims to primarily support the development of the recipient
country.5 On the other hand, the red refers (OOF) to Other Official Flows, which is nonconcessional in terms with less than 25% grants and is primarily intended for commercial
or representational purposes.6

AIDDATA. “China's Global Development Footprint.” AidData, a research lab at William and Mary.
William and Mary. Accessed April 23, 2020. https://www.aiddata.org/china-official-finance.
6
AIDDATA. “China's Global Development Footprint.”
5
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While both nations use foreign aid to promote their interests overseas, they do so
with very different tools. Comparing the two, the lion’s share of the U.S. financial aid is
given in the form of more concessional ODA, while China uses much less concessional
methods in OOF. The difference in methods has serious implications for the effectiveness
of foreign aid in terms of supporting the recipient country. According to research by
Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, Strange, and Tierney, less concessional and more commerciallyoriented types of official finance do not boost economic growth, unlike more
concessional forms of aid.7 While both the U.S. and China use foreign aid to push a
political agenda (Chinese methods and goals are discussed in a later section) the
argument that recipients of U.S. aid are comparatively better off is bolstered by the
difference in these methods and their outcomes for the host country.

China in Latin America
China’s role in Latin America is a topic of some debate in the existing literature.
Some, such as Watson, see China as almost purely economically motivated, seeking raw
materials and ports through which to ship goods.8 Others, such as Friend and Thayer,
attribute Chinese action in the region to more fundamental ideological goals, namely
supporting an alternative to the Washington Consensus and using ideological victories to

7

Dreher, Axel, Andreas Fuchs, Bradley Parks, Austin M. Strange, and Michael J. Tierney. 2017. Aid,
China, and Growth: Evidence from a New Global Development Finance Dataset. AidData Working Paper
#46. Williamsburg, VA: AidData at William & Mary.
8
Watson, Cynthia A. “Concentrated Interests: China's Involvement with Latin American Economics.” In
China's Global Engagement: Cooperation, Competition, and Influence in the 21st Century, 123–51.
Brookings Institution Press, n.d.

Pendergrast 8
secure economic gains.9 This alternative, which Friend and Thayer term the Beijing
Consensus, “advances authoritarian government, state-led economic development,
protected markets, and acceptable corruption and crony capitalism” in direct contrast with
the free-market-oriented Washington Consensus.10 Per these opinions, Chinese intentions
regarding lending policy lie between the unadulterated pursuit of profit and an attempt at
ideological conquest. The theory that Beijing has greater flexibility regarding corruption
and less than free markets helps to explain how China made inroads with some of South
America’s less democratically inclined nations, including Ecuador under Rafael Correa.
However, Chinese involvement in Latin America differs between nations; for
example, Ellis proposes that, in nations such as Ecuador that have held long-term antiAmerican sentiment, Chinese investment is an alternative to organizations such as the
World Bank and the IMF.11 Further, Ellis states: “Chinese purchases, loans, and
investments in Latin America have undercut the United States’ leverage in demanding
adherence to certain practices of democracy, human rights and free trade” which enabled
leaders such as Correa to pursue their agenda in open hostility with the United States.12
China’s involvement in Colombia is more economically oriented, according to Peña, but
the authors cite the scale of the investments and the strategies of Chinese firms in
Colombia as a cause for concern.13 However, Ellis and Peña agree that the role of the

Friend, John M., and Bradley A. Thayer. “Han-Centrism Provides Strategic Asymmetries for the United
States.” In How China Sees the World: Han-Centrism and the Balance of Power in International Politics,
85–93. Potomac Books, 2018.
10
Friend and Thayer, 88
11
Ellis, Robert Evan. The Strategic Dimension of Chinese Engagement with Latin America. Washington,
DC: William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, 2013.
12
Ellis, 141
13
Peña, Natalia Gómez, and Karla Díaz. “INVERSIONES CHINAS EN COLOMBIA: ¿CÓMO VAN LOS
PROYECTOS ...” Ambiente y Sociedad. Accessed February 20, 2020.
https://www.ambienteysociedad.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/participacionchinaenelpais-1.pdf.
9
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U.S. in these countries acts as a tempering factor. In Ecuador and other nations holding
popular anti-U.S. sentiment, Ellis argues, China attempts to distance itself from antiAmerican rhetoric to preserve its relationship with the U.S.; China does so even while
enabling those countries to flaunt U.S. authority in the region.14 On the other hand, Ellis
argues Colombia’s ties to the U.S. have prompted caution from Beijing, leading to a more
indirect approach described by both Ellis and Peña: more limited infrastructure and
military investment, and Chinese firms instead choosing to buy the branches of foreign
companies already operating in Colombia and merge those holdings into their own.15,16
Regardless of the motivation, the data shows that the number of investment deals
between China and Latin America has risen sharply over time, as shown in Figure 1.
With most deals being financed by the Chinese Development Bank in some capacity, the
increase in deals has gone hand in hand with rising debts to China. As these debts
increase, so too does China’s presence in the decision-making process of the host
country.

14

Ellis, 4-5
Ellis, 146
16
Peña 8-10
15
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China and Debt Diplomacy
The fact that China is loaning large

Figure 2:
Annual Chinese FDI in Latin America

amounts of money to less developed countries
for a variety of projects is well known; the
rapid increase in Chinese investment in Latin
America can be seen in Figure 2. However,
Chinese intentions regarding those debtor
nations are less clear.17 The theory is that
Data Source: Bureau van Dijk, fDi Markets

China aims to use the debt it holds to leverage
Graphic Source: Atlantic Council

debtor nations into conceding fore favorable
trade deals or strategic gains for China: Debt Diplomacy.18 However, as Parker and
Chefitz point out, “the coercive leveraging of debt to acquire strategic assets or political
influence over debtor nations…is by itself neither an economic tool nor a strategic end.
Rather, it is an increasingly valuable technique deployed by China to leverage
accumulated debt to advance its existing strategic goals.”19 As evaluated earlier, this
technique is not new, nor is it exclusive to China. Parker and Chefitz are choosing to
clarify that the leveraging of the debt and the accruing of the debt by China are separate
processes, rather than one long-term strategy. However, others are not as convinced;
Chellaney attributes China’s lending to a more deliberate quest for manipulation and

17

Dollar diplomacy or debt trap?: examining Chinas role in the western hemisphere: hearing before the
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade of the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Sixteenth Congress, first session, May 9, 2019, § (n.d.).
18
Chellaney, Brahma. “China's Debt-Trap Diplomacy by Brahma Chellaney.” Project Syndicate, January
23, 2017. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-one-belt-one-road-loans-debt-by-brahmachellaney-2017-01.
19
Parker, Sam and Gabrielle Chefitz. “Debtbook Diplomacy.” Paper, Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, May 24, 2018.
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access: “[T]he projects that China is supporting are often intended not to support the local
economy, but to facilitate Chinese access to natural resources, or to open the market for
its low-cost and shoddy export goods… It became clear only later that China’s real
objectives were commercial penetration and strategic leverage.”20 This argument requires
the assumption that China began lending years ago with a long-term strategy in mind,
which is a stretch. However, it does help to explain why China has been so keen to lend
so much money to countries that cannot afford to pay back their loans and likely never
will.21 For example, Ecuador’s debt to China is estimated to stand around 38.7% of GDP,
and that number will only increase as Ecuador continues to borrow.22
Further, examples of China’s not explicitly economic influence are noteworthy
for their support of either influence theory. China has created more than 40 Confucius
Institutes throughout Latin America, supporting that effort with an information initiative
partnering Chinese state television with several local outlets.23 Furthermore, China
supplied varying types of surveillance systems for Uruguay, Mexico, Ecuador, Bolivia,
Panama, Venezuela, and Argentina, and in doing so provided both the Chinese and host

Chellaney, Brahma. “China's Debt-Trap Diplomacy.” Project Syndicate, January 23, 2017.
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-one-belt-one-road-loans-debt-by-brahma-chellaney2017-01.
21
Chellaney, Brahma. “China's Debt-Trap Diplomacy.”
22
Koening, Kevin. “China's Amazon Footprint Gets Scant Attention in Ecuador's Election.” Dialogo
Chino, May 2, 2019. https://dialogochino.net/en/trade-investment/8562-chinas-amazon-footprint-getsscant-attention-in-ecuadors-election/.
23
Dollar diplomacy or debt trap, 29
20
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Photo Credits: Jonah M. Kessel, Melissa Chan, Paul
Mozur and John Woo of the New York Times

governments access to surveillance
components, not unlike those found in
Beijing.24 Ellis points out that these
systems are not inherently negative, but
Figure 3: A collection of photos depicting
the ECU911 Surveillance system in Ecuador

can incentivize autocratic regimes to
suppress dissent by making surveillance

simpler while providing other nations with an alternative to privacy and respect for
citizens’ rights.25 As depicted in Figure 3, the implementation of the ECU911 system has
clear parallels to Chinese surveillance systems, and a large workforce monitoring the
cameras. Additionally, some fear that private information may be available to Chinese
authorities or companies through these systems. Further, it acclimates the population to
privacy violations that could later lead to a more rigid suppression of rights.26 All of this

Ellis, Evan. “Chinese Surveillance Complex Advancing in Latin America.” Newsmax. Newsmax Media,
Inc. Newsmax Media, Inc., April 12, 2019. https://www.newsmax.com/evanellis/china-surveillance-latinamerica-cameras/2019/04/12/id/911484/.
25
Ellis, Evan. “Chinese Surveillance Complex Advancing in Latin America.”
26
Dollar diplomacy or debt trap, 23
24
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is to say that China using its economic inroads to offer its political model as an
alternative to that offered by the U.S. and Western Europe.
The Unique Position of Chinese Firms and Foreign Investment
Traditionally, FDI theory states that a multinational corporation operating within
a country has chosen to do so due to locational advantages and market pressures, and is
welcomed in doing so because it brings with it the opportunity for growth, explains
Oatley.27 This growth can be in the form of capital (human or physical) that a host
country is lacking, new technology and expertise for future use by the workers of the host
country, or new access to marketing networks in the global marketing chain.28 However,
Chinese firms do not operate in a classically profit-seeking private enterprise manner;
rather than decisions being made based on market forces, Chinese firms must consider a
mixture of profit and political expedience caused by the unique relationship these firms
have with their government. Though private companies exist in China, they lack
independence from the government in their decision making. As companies, they cannot
afford to completely ignore the market; however, Feng argues that, at the end of the day,
these companies have almost no power to resist direct requests from the Chinese Communist
Party.29 This is largely due to laws restricting independence from the Party, including the
2017 National Intelligence Law, which states that every organization must support, assist,
and cooperate with national intelligence work, and builds upon the legal framework set forth by
both the national security and cybersecurity laws.30 Therefore, despite being private entities in

27

Oatley, Thomas H. International Political Economy. 5th ed. Boston: Longman, 2012.
Oatley 173-174
29
Feng, Ashley. “We Can't Tell If Chinese Firms Work for the Party.” Foreign Policy, February 7, 2019.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/07/we-cant-tell-if-chinese-firms-work-for-the-party/.
30
Feng, Ashley. “We Can't Tell If Chinese Firms Work for the Party.”
28
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name, there is no way to be certain that any given decision was made by the company in
the interest of profit, or the Chinese government
Figure 4: State Owned vs. Private:
Chinese Firms in Latin America

with some other end in mind.
In Latin America, only 19% of Chinese
companies involved in FDI are non-state owned,
as shown in Figure 4. This grants the Chinese
government a larger amount of control over the
investment in the region. Further, the benefits

Oatley described as available to host nations are
Data Source: Bureau van Dijk, fDi
Markets

less accessible to those nations partnering with
Chinese multinational corporations due to their

frequent use of Chinese workers instead of their local counterparts.31 Chinese firms’
reliance on Chinese employees for labor deprives participating countries of jobs, thereby
restricting technology transfer and expertise while limiting the economic benefits to the
local community.
These two items complicate the assessment of China’s involvement in
Latin America. First, one must consider that any action taken by a Chinese firm to enter
into the region is done with the blessing of the Chinese government. Second, Chinese
firms’ predominant use of Chinese laborers over those of the host country is no secret to
the nations in which China is forging these development contracts. Third, China’s use of
lending to secure funding for these endeavors shows interest beyond a traditional return

Chandran, Nyshka. “China Can Make Its Belt and Road Project More Successful If It Taps Locals,
Experts Say.” CNBC. CNBC, September 14, 2018. https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/14/china-must-domore-to-tap-locals-in-belt-and-road-initiative-panel.html.
31
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on investment, as many of these countries cannot afford to pay back the loans they
already have and still have the option of securing further financing.32 Finally, China
accepts in-kind repayments, often in the form of natural resources or rights thereto in
place of monetary compensation.33 Taken together, a pattern begins to emerge. China
offers a development package to a nation, securing the contract for a Chinese firm; often
the firms are state-owned, but some are “private” enterprises.34 The projects themselves
have a habit of running over budget, have poor construction quality, and mostly end with
little in the way of financial returns, with that little that comes in being routed back to
China.35 All of this makes debt repayment more difficult. Then, China’s government
begins to offer in-kind deals to address the overwhelming debt, which can point business
back to those same firms that have already underperformed.36 Without an increase in
revenue, the nations in question have little choice but to accept China’s offer rather than
repay the now-staggering debt.
Highlighting the role of Chinese lending in its foreign direct investment, Figure 5
shows the rise in Chinese lending to Latin America and the analogous rise in foreign
direct investment in the region. As countries in the region owe China more and more,
they strike more deals to bring in Chinese firms, which bring more lending. The result is

32

Parker, Sam and Gabrielle Chefitz, 24
Parker, Sam and Gabrielle Chefitz, 32
34
Avendano, Ronaldo, Angel Melguizo, and Sean Miner. “Chinese FDI in Latin America: New Trends
with Global ...” Atlantic Council, June 2017. https://publications.atlanticcouncil.org/china-fdi-latinamerica/.
35
Parker, Sam and Gabrielle Chefitz, 4
36
Chellaney, Brahma. “China's Debt-Trap Diplomacy.” 1
33
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the steady rise in debt and FDI as the cycle continues and the region finds itself deeper in
debt.
Figure 5: Graphs of Chinese Lending and FDI in Latin America

Chinese Lending to Latin America
(Billion USD)

Annual Chinese FDI in Latin
America

160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Loan Amount in Given Year

Cumulative Loan Total

Source: Gallagher, Kevin P. and Margaret Myers
of the Inter-American Dialogue

Source: Bureau van Dijk, fDi Markets
Graphic Credit: Atlantic Council

It is hard to say whether the Chinese firms in these scenarios are acting as tools of
the CCP, or witting co-conspirators angling for profitable contracts. However, either way,
the role of these firms can be said to be an extension of the will of the Chinese
government. Therefore, this project will refer to “China” for the actions of the
government, but not excluding the actions of state-owned and “private” firms that act at
the direction of that same government.

Introduction
I.

Intro and Relevant History
In light of the diversity of interests and methods carried out by China in this

region, this project seeks to discover: How does economic investment by China advance
Chinese policy goals in Colombia and Ecuador? Chinese influence in developing nations
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may have profound effects on those countries’ policies, economies, and even the regional
balance of power. Though China claims a policy of non-interference, countries often
make accommodations before receiving Chinese help, or in return for debt
renegotiation.37 Because China has a long-term hold on countries in which it holds debt,
assessing China’s power in such countries is vital to understanding the role the nation
will play in Latin America in the future.
Over the past decade, China has steadily increased its economic presence
throughout the global south.38 However, when it comes to scholarly analysis of Chinese
investment policy, much of the focus has been placed on Africa despite major Chinese
investments throughout Latin America. As Chinese investment expands in Latin
America, the role of the United States as a regional hegemon is threatened. Further,
economic inroads would allow China to expand its Belt and Road Initiative, and thereby
gain a stronger foothold in the region as a whole through a greater amount of trade.
Ecuador, providing the example of a nation with an extensive history of Chinese
investment, provides an analysis of how relations with China develop over time.
Colombia, whose relations with China are much less advanced, provides a glimpse of
how China is seeking to establish itself in developing nations, and how Chinese goals
shape the development process. This paper will analyze China’s use of lending to
facilitate joint infrastructure projects that result in the host nation being mired in debt.
Essentially, the model called Debt Trap Diplomacy by some critics constitutes a heavy
focus on the rights to natural resources not commonly found in the model. By lending to

37

Parker, Sam and Gabrielle Chefitz, 25
Koleski, Katherine and U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Backgrounder: China in
Latin America. Washington, D.C.: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2011
38
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developing nations, China can gain access to the natural resources needed to power its
economy. Furthermore, by loaning money to those nations as an incentive for access to
resource rights, China gains potential leverage over the governments in those countries,
especially if and when the debt amounts to the point where repayment would be
prohibitively costly to an office motivated government because of the extreme austerity
that would be required to repay it.
With Chinese investment on the rise globally, it is unsurprising that Latin
America has seen an increase in Chinese projects and loans. However, the political and
economic diversity of the region necessitates flexibility on the part of China; both its
goals and methods must shift depending on the nation in question. For those who find
themselves at odds with the United States, investment from China is attractive in its own
right, as it claims to bring development and capital without the requirements imposed by
western counterparts such as the World Bank.
In cases where nations are happy to turn to China, loans via the Chinese
Development Bank is a common and straightforward route. Chinese firms receive
contracts to work on development projects funded by Chinese loans, and the country in
question can continue to carry on criticizing the U.S., the IMF, or any other common
target. However, China adopts more indirect methods with nations, such as Colombia,
where Chinese investment may be regarded with caution in part due to vested U.S.
interests. For example, in terms of mineral extraction, China can purchase divisions of
corporations already mining in the area rather than try to contract Chinese firms directly.
This method is less binding than full-on investment but allows for China to gain access to
resources and markets in less hospitable nations.
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II.

Chinese Goals and Progress
Important to answering this question is also defining what, exactly, are Chinese

goals in each country, and how those goals fit in with the more general goals for China
globally and within Latin America as a region. Globally, China seeks to expand the Belt
and Road Initiative and gain access to natural resources, both of which can be achieved
by fostering economic connections with developing nations. Regionally, China pursues
both these goals, but with the added incentive to reduce U.S. influence in its backyard.
On a country level, both Ecuador and Colombia provide examples of specific Chinese
targets (natural resources) and more general goals (subversion of U.S. authority). From
Ecuador, China is already receiving a large share of oil, but every renegotiation provides
China further opportunity to further leverage its situation and maintain hospitable
conditions for Chinese firms in Ecuador, possibly gaining better deals for manufacturers
there. As will be later explained, Chinese goals in this sense likely focus more on
maintaining a steady flow of natural resources and strengthening its partnership, rather
than leveraging some new boon from the country. On the other hand, Chinese
development in Colombia is still a relatively new venture, so the potential for expansion
is very much there. Currently, China has an extensive swathe of mineral rights it obtained
by buying companies already present, inferring that China’s interests in Colombia are
also mineral in nature.41 However, China’s plans for developing Buenaventura Industrial
Park and other infrastructure projects show that there is more as well, using Colombia’s
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position along both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans to better facilitate supply chains and
shipping while offering loans through the Chinese Development Bank.42 Colombia has a
lot to offer China, as will be discussed later, and currently, China appears to be building
goodwill with the Colombian government in order to gain better access to what it is
looking for.

Case Study: Ecuador
I.

Overview: Ecuador
In Ecuador, China has invested in several multibillion-dollar projects including oil

and gas refineries, education and technology initiatives, migration support, and
infrastructure projects.63 While many projects were announced under the Correa
administration, Chinese investment has by no means stopped under Moreno; for example,
in August of 2019, Chinese feed manufacturer Haid announced plans to build a 50,000metric-ton capacity shrimp processing plant in Ecuador after the company broke ground
on a $35 million shrimp feed plant in January.64
Possibly the most famous Chinese investment in Ecuador is the infrastructure
arena. A series of projects and budgets were financed using around $19 billion in Chinese
loans packaged for not just massive hydroelectric dams but also for bridges, highways,
irrigation, schools, and health clinics. Ecuador pays at least some of the loans by sending

42

Peña, 22
Gallagher, Kevin P. and Margaret Myers (2019) "China-Latin America Finance Database," Washington:
Inter-American Dialogue.
64
Palau, Mariana. “China Looks to Expand Colombia's Buenaventura Port.” 中外对话 China Dialogue,
November 29, 2017. https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/10250-China-looks-to-expandColombia-s-Buenaventura-port.
63

Pendergrast 21
80% of its oil exports to China at a reduced price; meanwhile, the dams are beginning to
fail due to quality issues and poor geological conditions.65
Projects financed by these loans are not always completed or even started. In
2011, China and Ecuador entered negotiations for a $12 billion refinery.66 The project
was supposed to increase domestic refining capacity, to compliment Ecuador’s extensive
oil reserves. Ecuador went in so far as to secure financing for the project and spend $1
billion preparing the site; however, negotiations for the project stalled, leaving Ecuador
repaying its loans with nothing but an empty lot to show for it.67
As of now, Ecuador is in an intermediary limbo between Pro-Chinese and AntiChinese sentiment fueled by dependence mixed with outrage about Chinese methods. The
previous administration under Rafael Correa courted Chinese support and lauded China
as a source of finance separate from the U.S., while the current Moreno administration
now seeks to distance itself from further Chinese lending.68 For example, Ecuador’s
energy minister, Carlos Pérez, told the New York Times: “China took advantage of
Ecuador. The strategy of China is clear. They take economic control of countries.”69
However, just last year, President Moreno flew to Beijing to negotiate some of Ecuador’s

Casey, Nicholas, and Clifford Krauss. “It Doesn't Matter If Ecuador Can Afford This Dam. China Still
Gets Paid.” The New York Times. The New York Times, December 24, 2018.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/24/world/americas/ecuador-china-dam.html.
66
Krauss, Clifford, and Keith Bradsher. “China's Global Ambitions, Cash and Strings Attached.” The New
York Times. The New York Times, July 24, 2015.
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/26/business/international/chinas-global-ambitions-with-loans-andstrings-attached.html.
67
Krauss, Clifford, and Keith Bradsher. “China's Global Ambitions, Cash and Strings Attached.”
68
Valencia, Alexandra. “Ecuador Seeks to Renegotiate China Debt, Does Not Rule out IMF -Moreno.”
Reuters. Thomson Reuters, December 6, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/ecuador-china/ecuadorseeks-to-renegotiate-china-debt-does-not-rule-out-imf-moreno-idUSL1N1YB1YZ.
69
Casey, Nicholas, and Clifford Krauss. “It Doesn't Matter If Ecuador Can Afford This Dam. China Still
Gets Paid.”
65

Pendergrast 22
massive debt to China and borrow another $900 million.70 Ecuador might be looking to
shift away from China, but whether or not they have the ability to get out from under
their Chinese debt is a different question. This is the lens through which this paper will
analyze Ecuador, the case study that has seen both a firmly pro-China and a warier
moderate regime in the last decade.
A unique aspect of Ecuador’s economy that makes the nation an even more
interesting example is the dollarization of its economy. In January of 2000, Ecuador
adopted the U.S. dollar as its legal tender in the midst of suffering an economic and
banking crisis.71 Experts have concluded that dollarization enabled Ecuador to modernize
and improve the soundness of its banking system.72 Further, they state that using the U.S.
dollar “promotes long-term investment and trade since businesses tend to be reassured by
the stability of the exchange rate.”73 However, dollarization strips Ecuador’s central bank
of the ability to have its own monetary policy. This limits the government’s ability to
adjust to the debt it holds, as it cannot manipulate its currency in order to facilitate an
easier repayment. Furthermore, some of the loans are denominated in Chinese Renminbi,
though how much is not public knowledge.74 Whatever tranche is denominated in
Renminbi, the Chinese government has even greater power over due to its ability to set
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the financial policy. China understands that Ecuador’s options for getting out from under
the debt are limited, and as such Ecuador is easily subject to the Debt Trap model.

II.

The Path to the Present
As previously mentioned, Ecuador dollarized its economy in January of 2000, all

but eliminating the possibility for Ecuador to finance public spending by increasing the
money supply.75 However, Ecuador’s public expenditure has increased over the
intervening years since its dollarization, from 23% of its GDP in 2000 to a peak of 44%
of GDP in 2014, and as of 2018, that number had only dipped to 37% of GDP, as shown
in Figure 6.76
To finance the continuing expenditure, Ecuador looked for outside sources of
funding, namely foreign debt. In 2005, Chinese-led consortium Andes Petroleum, which
includes China National Petroleum Corp. and Sinopec group, bought Canada-based
Encana’s oil and pipeline assets in Ecuador for $1.42 billion.77
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Figure 6
Source: TradingEconomics.com
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Under President Rafael Correa (2007-2017), Chinese investment took off: in
2010, Ecuador and China signed a series of agreements totaling $3.3 billion, including
$1.7 billion for the Coca Codo Sinclair Dam project and $571 million for the Sopladora
hydroelectric dam.78

Ecuador Government Debt to GDP (%)
Figure 7

Sources: TradingEconomics.com, Ecuador Ministry of Finance
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In the years to come, China invested even more heavily, and Ecuador’s Debt to
GDP ratio increased dramatically, as shown in Figure 7. In July of 2011, a renewable
energy development loan of $2 billion; in December of 2012, a loan to finance the 2013
budget deficit of $2 billion; in January of 2015, a loan to support transportation,
education, and health care projects of $5.3 billion; also in January of 2015, a loan to
finance the 2015 Annual Investment Plan of $1.5 billion; in February of 2016, a loan to
fund the Yachay education complex of $198 million; in April of 2016, a nondiscretionary and infrastructure loan of $2 billion; in December of 2018, a development
assistance loan of $900 million; and in December of 2018, a loan to fund reconstruction
projects of $69 million.79

17420

17420

Cumulative Debt to China (Million USD)

2016

2017

969
0

2000

2198

2014

7050

8172

2013

509

7663

2011

392

2012

5271

7271

2010

2000

3271
3271

15222

Debt incurred in given year (Million USD)

18389

ECUADOR'S DEBTS TO CHINA

2015

2018

Figure 8 (Red line indicates shift in Administration from Rafael Correa to Lenin Moreno)
Source: The Dialogue’s China-Latin America Finance Database
As shown in Figure 8, this lending accumulated over time into over $18 billion in
debt without considering interest. As terms are not public for many of the loans, it is
impossible to say exactly what total the debt stands at today.
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As the financing continued to pour in, the projects themselves began to lose their
luster. The most prominent of the Chinese investment projects in Ecuador was the Coca
Codo Sinclair Dam, a massive hydroelectric plant which was to provide over 40% of
Ecuador’s electricity.80 China provided the funds for the massive undertaking as part of a
loan package through the Chinese Development Bank; the dam itself merited a $1.68B
loan.81 It was the single largest investment in Ecuador’s history.82
Unfortunately, it was also a failure. The ecological and geological studies on the
location were dangerously out of date, and the dam was built in the shadow of an active
volcano despite warnings that seismic activity could trigger deadly floods.83 Only a few
years after its completion, thousands of cracks spiderweb the dam’s machinery and the
reservoir is clogged, preventing the dam from running efficiently and risking serious
damage to the structure itself.84 The technicians cannot bring the dam to generate over
half its capacity; neither the dam’s structural integrity nor Ecuador’s power grid could
withstand it the first and only time they tried.85 To make matters worse, most of the
Ecuadorean officials who lobbied for the dam’s construction are jailed or sentenced on
bribery charges. Leaving Ecuador with a dam that barely works, a potential for collapse
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and major flooding, and $19 billion owed to China for various projects that have failed
to perform as promised.86
Figure 9 shows a sign labeling a dial from Coca Codo Sinclair Dam in Chinese,
English, and Spanish. The Chinese, correctly, reads: “Direct-Current (DC) Pumping
Group.” The Spanish, on the other hand, reads “Pressure Group from Washington, D.C.”
Because of poor attention to detail, Ecuadorian workers are left with nonsensical signs to
try and operate the machinery. In Figure 10, an emergency phone from Coca Codo
Sinclair is labeled mostly in Chinese with one smaller line in English. No Spanish label is
present to alert Ecuadorian workers, creating potential safety issues in the event of an
emergency.

Figure 10 Photo Credit: Federico Rios
Escobar for The New York Times
Figure 9 Photo Credit: Federico Rios
Escobar for The New York Times
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The failure of prestige projects such as the Coca Coda Sinclair Dam is more than
just an unfortunate; it’s expensive. Because of the damage to the dam, Ecuador will have
to spend more than it anticipated in maintaining it, all while it generates much less
electricity than was promised. To finance these repairs, Ecuador may well have to turn to
China for funding, extending an already vicious cycle of debt negotiation. China already
claims 80% of Ecuador’s oil exports as payment on its existing debt.87 As Ecuador is
unable to pay back the balance, President Moreno must petition China for leniency. In
2018, President Moreno went to Beijing to renegotiate Ecuador’s debt, and Beijing
complied – along with lending Ecuador $900 million more.88 So long as the debt is
renegotiated, China can ask further concessions and extend the time for which Ecuador
will remain indebted to China. Without western assistance, Ecuador has little choice but
to continue depending on China.
So, in early 2019, Moreno’s government petitioned for IMF assistance. In March
of that year, the IMF agreed to a $4.2 billion lending program.89 Moreno turning to the
IMF granted him some leeway with China, as now there were other lenders in play.
However, the move was immensely unpopular, and the austerity measures that came with
IMF assistance led the government to the brink of disaster. Cuts made to fuel subsidies,
in an effort to reduce government spending and meet IMF benchmarks, led to outright
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violence in the streets of Quito.90 The protests paralyzed the city, forcing the government
to relocate temporarily and rescind the move and therefore fail to meet one target the IMF
had set while leaving President Moreno much less popular.91 Further, a botched tax
reform effort cost Moreno heavily in terms of political capital, and the watered-down
reform he eventually managed to pass failed to raise even half of what the IMF had
targeted for the effort.92 The IMF expects Ecuador to introduce further reforms, stating
after the passage of the cut-down reform bill “This momentum should continue into early
2020 with the submission of more reform bills.”93 Moreno mobilizing further austerity
measures will likely prove difficult in the face of plummeting approval ratings and a
hostile Congress.94 Indigenous groups are calling for the government to cease interacting
with the IMF altogether.95 Moreno is now caught between adjusting to meet the IMF’s
standards, a move that could mean political suicide, or accepting even more assistance
from China, a move that could further perpetuate Ecuador’s dependence and endanger its
long term growth.
While alternatives to Chinese finance are available, the strings attached are so costly
that the potential damage puts into question the validity of such options as a viable
alternative. As seen in Figure 11, protests over President Moreno’s attempt to do away
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with fuel subsidies quickly turned violent, turning Quito into a warzone between
protestors and the police. The protests quickly evolved from outrage over the fuel
subsidies being cut to demands for Moreno to step down and condemnations of the IMF.

Figure 11: Demonstration Photos
Photo Credits: Reuters’ Ivan Castenaria and Daniel Tapia

III.

Qualifying Chinese Influence in
Ecuador
To gauge China’s effectiveness in using economic investment to influence

Ecuador and further its own goals in the region, it is important to keep in mind just what
those goals might be, and the role both parties have in any attempts to influence one
another.
The first questions to ask are: What does success look like to China? What would
it look like to Ecuador? From there, comparing the goals of each nation to the scope of
their leverage will allow assessment of realistic limits of each nation’s ability to achieve
its goals. Finally, an assessment of the costs of using the tools to achieve those ends, and
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comparing that to their likelihood of success, will create a framework by which the
situation may be assessed as a whole.
So, what does China want from Ecuador? China most likely has a lot of
overlapping goals for the region – some narrow and some specific. Here, I focus on two
of China’s goals that are easiest to visualize. The first, and perhaps most obvious of these
goals is oil; China has gone out of its way to ensure that Ecuador continues to send large
amounts of discounted oil as payment on the debt it owes China. While resources play no
small role in China’s designs on Ecuador, while looking to the future, it is key to consider
additional possibilities. Second, Ecuador’s proximity to China is in part a response to the
Correa administration’s distancing from the United States, and increasing that distance is
well within China’s interests.96
It would be no great leap to assess that Ecuador’s goals are to gain a more stable
footing and begin to extricate itself from the deep hole of debt it has plunged into.
Looking at the recent negotiations in Beijing, its progress has been dubious. On one hand,
renegotiating the debt provided Ecuador breathing room and the ability to move forward;
however, the additional loan, though good in the short term, overall deepened the hole.
Further, joining the Belt and Road Initiative means Ecuador will likely see more Chinesefinanced projects in the future. With Chinese funding comes Chinese debt, and through
that a prolonged obligation to return to China again and again in order to negotiate on a
debt Ecuador cannot feasibly pay.
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However, the question of Ecuador’s involvement in the Belt and Road Initiative is
a more complicated matter. In 2018, during President Moreno’s trip to Beijing to
renegotiate Ecuador’s debt, along with accepting $900 million in additional loans,
Moreno signed a Memorandum of Understanding declaring that Ecuador would join the
Belt and Road Initiative.97 It is unclear if joining the initiative was a condition for the
renegotiation of Ecuador’s debt, but the timing would lead one to believe that the two
issues are indeed connected.
As in previous cases, Beijing has hinted that more assistance is available to those
nations that participate in the Belt and Road Initiative.98 It is no great leap to speculate
that further financing from China was indeed stipulated upon Ecuador's joining the Belt
and Road initiative, and it is possible to analyze that decision to gain insight into the
decision-making process of each of these nations. First, the initial positions of both
parties must be considered: China, holding Ecuador’s debt, appears at first to have
control in the situation. However, Ecuador’s position as the debtor leaves it with the
ultimate ability to walk away; Ecuador could simply refuse to pay the debt, default, and
move on. To do so would have harsh consequences, but it remains an option nonetheless.
This leaves the status quo as an entrenched option: Ecuador remains in debt, but
China does not try to force Ecuador to pay more than they are able or do something they
are vehemently opposed to doing, for fear that the nation will simply walk away.
Schelling, in his work discussing negotiations between states, described such a situation
as: “a status quo from which one can be dislodged only by an overt act, an act that
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precipitates mutual damage because the maneuvering party has relinquished the power to
retreat.”99 The bargaining model the two thereby find themselves in is as follows:
Ecuador cannot retreat; it must negotiate with China or be forced into default. However,
the threat of that default is enough to force China to consider the consequences of its
terms because, should it ask too much, it could prompt Ecuador to choose default over
agreement. Therefore, the options which China presented were sweetened enough to
assuage Ecuador while getting them to agree to join the Belt and Road. Given the result
of the meeting, it is clear that Ecuador would rather take out another loan and join
China’s Belt and Road Initiative than go into default.

Figure 12: Posorja, Ecuador
Map Credit: Google Maps

Furthermore, negotiation between the two
states holds several benefits for both parties. For China, using
further loans and renegotiation as an incentive to convince
Ecuador to act as China would prefer brings with it the added
benefit of elongating Ecuador’s indebtedness and ensuring the
nation will return to renegotiate the debt again and again. An
example of a potential benefit for China is in expanded access to Ecuador’s ports. To
ensure it has the best chance of transporting its goods, China is looking for large ports, in
countries willing to accommodate China but also stable enough that violence and regime
change are not a threat to commerce. Securing such a location in Ecuador would fit the
bill nicely. Posorja, pictured below in Figure 12, is in the midst of major redevelopment.
Chinese lending financed the redevelopment of the port into a facility that can house
more vessels suited for deeper waters. Though the contract to redevelop the port was
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finalized before Ecuador agreed to join Belt and Road, further infrastructure
developments will likely follow as a result of Ecuador joining the Initiative. The longer
China can draw out Ecuador’s indebtedness, the more projects like Posorja it will be able
to finance, and ultimately further both its goal to maintain Ecuador’s debtor status and
expand its access to Latin American markets.
In the case of Ecuador, receiving such funds and renegotiating the debt allows the
country to move forward without dealing with the disastrous consequences of defaulting
on its massive loans to China. Without Chinese lending, it is doubtful Ecuador would be
able to continue operating without great hardship, even with the IMF’s recent assistance.
Since dollarization, Ecuador has relied heavily on outside financing to fund public
expenditure. For example, in 2013 alone, Chinese loans funded 61% of Ecuador’s public
expenditure.100 This reliance means that any decline in outside funding will have to be
paralleled by a decline in public spending, and recent protests over austerity measures
have already shown how the public would react to such efforts. Given that recent
turbulence, any drastic change in circumstance could lead to more demonstrations, with
potentially more severe consequences for Moreno and his government, including the
potential for Moreno and his government to lose power entirely.

IV.

Outlook
Looking to the future, Ecuador’s shift towards western institutions indicates a

desire to balance the sources of its debts. However, the difficulties Moreno has already
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faced in his attempt to borrow from the IMF could endanger his plan, and the history of
the IMF in dealing with Latin America is, to put it mildly, not cause for optimism. China
holds a large portion of Ecuador’s debt, and if future debt negotiations contain more
loans like the one in 2018 did, it is unlikely Ecuador will be able to make much progress
in climbing out of the mire of Chinese debt it finds itself in. Given the amount of
privilege China currently enjoys in Ecuador’s dependence, and that the IMF is attempting
to prove it and its methods can deliver Ecuador from its economic issues, Ecuador should
not expect any assistance from either arena should it choose to walk away from its debts
and try to start fresh. For the foreseeable future, Ecuador will have to focus on balancing
its own needs with those of China and the IMF and hope that there is still a country left to
run when the two are through.

V.

Has China Advanced Policy Goals in Ecuador Through its Economic
Investment?

To assess whether or not Chinese investment in Ecuador has generated influence
by which China has been able to advance its policy goals, one must first define China’s
policy goals in Ecuador. Then, an evaluation must be made regarding how much progress
has been made or is likely to be made in the future. Finally, there must be a distinction as
to how much of that progress is attributable to Chinese investment, and how much is
better described as originating elsewhere.
As previously discussed, China’s primary goal in Ecuador is the acquisition of
natural resources, namely oil. However, as far as policy goals are concerned, it is not the
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‘what’ China wants, but the ‘how’ that helps define the goal itself. China’s long-term
need for natural resources has only grown in recent years.101 As such, China does not
merely want oil; it wants a consistent supply. Chinese hold on Ecuador via the terms of
the loans provide just that constancy.
Aside from oil, China wants Ecuadorean cooperation to further its Belt and Road
initiative. Ecuador’s position, with lucrative markets to the north and south, make the
nation a potential trade hub for commerce coming over from Asia.
So, considering these two goals, it is now possible to assess the success China has
had so far and the likelihood that China will continue to succeed. For the first, it seems
that China has succeeded in securing a stable supply of Ecuadorian oil in the coming
years, bar any serious conflict between the two countries. The deal that secured 80% of
Ecuador’s oil exports for China is set to run out in 2024 unless it is extended as a price
for renegotiating Ecuador’s debt, which is not outside the realm of possibility.
Second, the Belt and Road Initiative in Ecuador also seems like a success for
China. Ecuador signed on to the initiative in December of 2018, of course, and new
construction seems to be paving the way for Chinese trade. For example, the southern
Ecuadorian port of Posorja is being developed now with large-scale trade in mind, and
the Chinese firm China Harbor has been contracted to do a large part of the port
construction work.102 This is likely to be the first of many such port projects that will be
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worked by Chinese firms under Ecuador’s participation in China’s Belt and Road
Initiative.
Finally, were these successes attributable to China’s economic investment in
Ecuador? The answer here, too, is yes. China’s deal for Ecuador’s oil comes from its
loans through the Chinese Development Bank, which were taken out as part of a
development plan for such projects as the Coca Codo Sinclair dam. As a result of those
debts, China was able to negotiate to receive the lion’s share of Ecuador’s oil in payment,
hence addressing a policy goal by using economic leverage.
In the case of the Belt and Road, Ecuador agreed to join the initiative during a
state visit to Beijing where President Moreno was attempting to renegotiate Ecuador’s
debts to China. Given that, as previously discussed, it is more than likely the two events
are connected, it is fair to say that Chinese debt spurred this decision as well. China’s
investment in Ecuador put China in a position where putting forth the Belt and Road as a
way to ensure the debt was renegotiated allowed China to virtually ensure Ecuador
agreed to join, and the projects already underway point towards success for China.

Case Study: Colombia
I.

Overview: Colombia

China’s interest in Colombia is diverse, including both natural and logistical
resources along with any political gain from inserting itself into the politics of a close
American ally. One example on the front of natural resources, Emerald Energy PLC, a
property of China’s state-owned Sinochem, was awarded a contract to explore an area of
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239,415 hectares in eight Colombian municipalities to exploit oil for the next 30 years.103
China’s investment in this region has already led to controversy, as the Colombian
government intervened on Sinochem’s behalf after local protestors complained that the
company had violated its environmental promises, going so far as to send the police to
break up the protests. This example helps illustrate the support for China’s ventures
within the Colombian government, and the impact such ventures have on local
communities.
Colombia is the United States’ closest ally in Latin America. In part due to this
proximity, and in part due to Colombia’s long-term struggle with civil war, there is little
Chinese investment in Colombia compared to nearby countries.104 The process by which
China would achieve a foothold in Colombia is made more difficult by political factors
stemming from close U.S. ties than it would be in states such as Ecuador, with long
histories of anti-U.S. sentiment leaving space for China. However, as peace negotiations
with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) progressed, Chinese interest
in new Colombian projects increased.105
Instead of relying solely on direct funding from the Chinese Development Bank to
place Chinese firms in Colombia, China has used an acquisition strategy to gain a
foothold in Colombia’s mineral industry. While the Chinese Development Bank has still
had a part in the investment, the scale is much smaller than that of Ecuador. Instead of
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offering loan packages to insert Chinese firms into the minerals sector, Chinese firms
have simply bought the divisions that already owned the rights to the area. For example,
in 2009 China’s state-owned Sinochem bought Emerald Energy,106 and in 2012 acquired
the Colombian operations of Total,107 two companies with extensive investments and
mineral rights in Colombia. More recently, Chinese JCHX Mining Management made a
deal with Canada’s Cordoba Minerals Corp where it gained a 19.9% stake in the
company.108 Furthermore, the deal granted the Chinese firm the right of first offer to be
appointed as the Engineering Procurement Construction contractor in connection with
any future mining development on and a right of first offer in respect of any sale of an
equity interest in the San Matias project, a copper and gold mining project 200 kilometers
north of Medellin.109 Through these deals, Chinese firms are gaining ground in Colombia
without the involvement of the Chinese Development Bank.
On the infrastructure front, however, the Chinese Development Bank is more
active. For example, China and Colombia announced a memorandum of understanding to
develop the area around the port of Buenaventura.110 Buenaventura is a major port on
Colombia’s Pacific coast which processes 27% of Colombia’s total customs revenue;
however, the city surrounding the port has suffered from poverty and systemic inequality

106

Peña, 9
Landauro, Inti. “Total Sells Colombian Assets to Sinochem for $1B.” MarketWatch. MarketWatch,
February 8, 2012. https://www.marketwatch.com/story/total-sells-colombian-assets-to-sinochem-for-1b2012-02-08.
108
“COPPER-GOLD: Chinas JCHX Takes Stake in Cordoba Minerals.” Canadian Mining Journal, January
6, 2020. http://www.canadianminingjournal.com/news/copper-gold-chinas-jchx-takes-stake-in-cordobaminerals/.
109
Cordoba Minerals Corp. “San Matias.” Projects. Accessed March 6, 2020.
http://cordobamineralscorp.com/projects/san-matias.
110
Peña, 24
107

Pendergrast 40
for years.111 Buenaventura is located well to be a trade hub; Colombia is the only Latin
American nation to have access to both the Pacific and the Caribbean, and Buenaventura
itself lies approximately halfway between Chile and Mexico, as can be seen below in
Figure 13. However, the city has long dealt with violence, and the locals suffer from a
62% unemployment rate. The project China proposes aims to combat both by providing
jobs, but the unstable situation could be a problem in realizing the ambitious project.
Using a development plan financed by the Chinese Development Bank, China has offered
to develop the surrounding area in “an integrated model of industrial, commercial,
logistical and social development by attracting public and private investment and
improving the quality of services that can [aid] foreign trade.”112 The extent of this
project is wide-reaching and provides insight into the many ways China involves itself
with host countries. Furthermore, Colombia’s reaction to the plan, including deliberation
of stripping land rights from local citizens, further testifies to China’s presence leading to
harm for local communities and an increased closeness with the government.
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II.

The Path to the Present
Colombia’s story when it comes to

China is more like two parallel plots
than one fluid narrative. On one side,
there is the story of Chinese firms and
their entrance into Colombian markets;
Figure 13: Buenaventura

on the other, the Chinese government’s

Map Credit: BBC

interest in development of Colombian infrastructure. Because of the unique nature of
Chinese firms being tied to government policies, it is important to look at both stories and
see if their parallels are coincidental or structural. Should evidence support the theory that
China is driving both narratives towards a single set of goals, then the parallels are
structural, otherwise, coincidental.
First, the investment of Chinese firms into Colombia’s mineral sector began in
earnest in the mid-2000s, with New Granada Energy, an oil exploration and production
firm that is a subsidiary of China’s state-owned Sinopec.
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Data Source: Peña, Natalia Gómez, and Karla Díaz. “INVERSIONES CHINAS EN COLOMBIA”

Over 14 months, New Granada gained mineral rights to 365,319 acres across
Colombia, the breakdown of which can be seen above in Figure 13.113 Later in 2006, a
joint venture called Mansarovar Energy Colombia was created by China’s Sinopec with
India’s ONGC-Videsh and the acquisition of ONIMEX, gaining the rights to nine
separate oil fields and exploratory ventures.114 In 2009, Sinochem, another Chinese staterun oil company, purchased British Emerald Energy Co., and with it all of its operations
within Colombia.115 In 2012, Sinochem continued the pattern by acquiring the Colombian
operations of Total, a French company.
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Data Source: Peña, Natalia Gómez, and Karla Díaz. “INVERSIONES CHINAS EN COLOMBIA”

Because of these purchases, Emerald Energy has the largest number of awarded
areas for exploration and exploitation in all of Colombia, over 1.5 million acres as shown
above in Figure 15. For reference, this is a territory considerably larger than the Florida
Everglades under the purview of a single Chinese firm. With this much territory has
come a series of social issues; local communities have come into conflict with Emerald
Energy more than once over the Chinese company’s environmental and business
practices.116 However, the Colombian government has by and large sided with Emerald,
sending in police to deal with protestors that interrupt the Chinese company’s business.117
These Chinese firms and their actions in Colombia are interesting for several reasons.
First, the rapid entrance and acquisition of territory. Between Emerald Energy and New
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Granada, Chinese firms gained rights to almost two million acres of land in eight years.
Meanwhile, by 2012, Mansarovar had become the fourth-largest oil enterprise in
Colombia with numerous holdings of its own.118 In recent years, Mansarovar has
singlehandedly represented over 8% of FDI into the Colombian oil sector.119 These
holdings are even more noteworthy when one considers that Colombia’s state-owned
Ecopetrol still manages over 50% of Colombia’s oil output.120 Therefore, of foreign
investors in Colombia’s oil fields, Chinese firms hold a large portion of the land
available, and their shares only continue to grow.
More recently, China’s JCHX Mining Management purchased a 19.9% stake in
Cordoba Minerals, a Canadian company, to advance the San Matias copper, gold, and
silver project in Colombia.121 Through this deal, JCHX guaranteed itself, among other
things, the right of first offer to be appointed the engineering procurement construction
contractor in connection with any future mining development at San Matias, and will also
have a right of first offer in respect of any sale of an equity interest in the project.122
These deals could leave Chinese firms with even more of a hold over Colombia’s mineral
sector as time goes on.
On the other hand, there are China’s interests in Colombia’s infrastructure, namely
the industrialization and modernization of existing structures to be financed by the
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Chinese Development Bank. Like other development projects China has focused on in
recent years, these would be aimed towards expanding ports to accommodate more large
ships and roads to accommodate more shipped goods. However, the projects are not
officially part of the Belt and Road Initiative, likely an

Figure 16
Map Credit: WorldAtlas.com

effort to not upset the U.S.123
The most prevalent of these projects is the renovation
of Buenaventura, a port on Colombia’s Pacific coast as
seen in Figure 16. Buenaventura is home to more than
half of Colombia’s imports and exports, but the lack of
commercial infrastructure in the port and surrounding area prevent revenues from staying
local. Instead, most of the profit goes to cities like Bogota hundreds of kilometers away.
Buenaventura is where 80% of Colombia’s coffee exports are transported, along with
60% of all of Colombia’s other exports.124 Furthermore, the port handles 60% of
Colombia’s imports.125 Despite the port being a massive trade hub, the community
around it is struggling to get by. Buenaventura suffers from a 62% unemployment rate,
making it one of the poorest cities in Colombia.126 Before the peace deal with the FARC
was signed, it was also the most violent, with an official homicide rate of 50 murders per
100,000 people, well above the national average; however, many residents believed the
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actual rate to be much higher.127 More recently, after the peace treaty was signed,
Colombia has mobilized forces to secure the community around the port and reduce the
violence, with a success that surprised the residents.128
Now, China and Colombia have signed a Memorandum of Understanding to
develop both the port itself and the surrounding area to create a commercial zone, the
Complex of Economic Activities in Buenaventura.129 The scope of the development itself
is massive; the project would allocate large areas to residential, industrial, scientific, and
technological development while replacing infrastructure for roads, water, and
electricity.130 Colombia hopes the project would quell the remaining violence in the city
by providing legal employment while generating new economic growth for the region as
a whole by allowing some of the port’s profits to stay local.131 However, some protest
leaders have argued that the government should deal directly with the more pressing
concerns of Buenaventura first, such as the still-rampant violence and gang activity.132
Proponents for the project such as Didier Sinisterra, manager for the project and
Buenaventura native, have claimed that the renovation and revitalization of Buenaventura
“will create 150 companies in 20 years, and more than 60,000 jobs,” and that
employment will eliminate the underlying drive for crime: poverty. 133
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China has offered to invest $16 million in the project through the Chinese
Development Bank, but the Colombian government hopes to attract additional financing
throughout the project.134 Though the investment is significantly smaller than those seen
elsewhere by the Chinese Development Bank, it is by no means insignificant.136 Under
the proposed model, a Chinese car manufacturing company would receive tax incentives
to establish an assembly plant in Buenaventura, which would open up for wider Latin
American distribution as a whole. Furthermore, Colombia has a coastline on both the
Pacific and the Caribbean, and the modernization of Buenaventura’s ports and
surrounding infrastructure could give Chinese goods an alternative to traversing the
Panama Canal which has proven too shallow for larger Chinese freight ships.137
The largest impediment to the project has nothing to do with China, but rather
internal Colombian disputes. Much of the region is populated by Afro-Colombians and
indigenous communities, and 70% of the 1,200 hectares of land the project would occupy
is owned by two legally recognized councils of these groups, known as the Caucana and
Gamboa councils. 138 The councils have already approved the project, but in March 2017,
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a judge annulled the councils’ land ownership titles.139 This put the project on hold while
the courts decide who exactly owns the land to be developed.

III.

Outlook
Given the path Colombia is headed down at this moment, it is likely China’s

economic investments will generate influence, but not in the same direct way as it is
being felt elsewhere. Instead of immediately facing mounting debts to the Chinese
Development Bank and agreeing to allow more Chinese firms to do business, it seems
more likely that the Chinese firms doing business will begin to pressure Colombia
into doing more infrastructure projects with China through the Chinese Development
Bank, accruing loans to China along the way. Ultimately, Colombia will have to
decide how much Chinese business it can do before beginning to alienate the U.S.,
but China’s commitment to accelerating interests in the country would suggest that
there might be more Chinese presence in the country than the U.S. would prefer very
soon, if not already.

IV.

Qualifying Chinese Influence in Colombia

Defining any current Chinese influence in Colombia will be difficult because of the
recent nature of China’s ventures in Colombia, but analyzing the potential for future
Chinese influence through the existing economic investment in Colombia provides an
interesting exercise to look back on later. To evaluate China’s potential to use economic
investment to influence Colombia and further its own goals in the region, one must again
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keep in mind just what those goals might be, and the role both parties have in any
attempts to influence one another.
As before, the first questions to ask are: What does success look like to China? What
would it look like to Colombia? From there, comparing the goals of each nation to the
scope of their leverage will allow assessment of realistic limits of each nation’s ability to
achieve its goals, either cooperatively or combatively. Finally, as before, an assessment
of the costs of using the tools to achieve those ends, and comparing that to their
likelihood of success, will create a framework by which the situation may be assessed as
a whole.
What is the status quo? Unlike Ecuador, neither side is entrenched; both Colombia
and China have invested with one another, but nothing is forcing one side to make a take
it or leave it decision. As it stands, the status quo is China having significant, but not
controlling, interest in the country’s mineral sector and an increasing role in the
infrastructure arena, while Colombia still maintains the independence feasibly walk away
from expanding Chinese interests without long-term economic damage.

That being the case, what would success in Colombia look like to China? Ultimately,
success could take several forms, but here the delineation will be between a partnership
and a dominant/subordinate relationship. Does China seek to dominate Colombia, or
work with the nation to further the goals of both?
Given China’s stance with other developing nations, it is much more likely that the
nation will seek to become the dominant force within the deal over the long term.
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Chinese deals with other Latin American nations have largely led to this outcome or are
well on their way, as are deals with other developing nations around the globe. China’s
debt diplomacy within the Belt and Road Initiative alone is said to have provided $440
billion in loans to developing nations that will have great difficulty in paying them
back.140
Further, Chinese actions in Colombia, though separate between explicit overture in
the infrastructure realm and indirect approaches via the acquisition of mineral rights and
territory, have the common thread of a dramatic increase over a relatively short period.
China is presenting itself as a major player in Colombia, and this aggressive rate of
investment parallels that found in other nations that have found themselves in China’s
debt trap.
Whether Colombia would agree to similar terms, however, is a different question.
Colombia’s political proximity to the U.S. coupled with the examples of Chinese
dependence scattered throughout the region will serve as a deterring factor. However, it is
difficult to believe that China has had the level of success present today due solely to
ignorance or negligence on the part of its partner countries. Though Colombia may not
intend to allow China to gain significant advantage via debt diplomacy, it is still a
possibility that China has developed methods to mire nations in debt.
Therefore, this bargaining model exists on a spectrum of China, working towards a
position of control, and Colombia, seeking investment without strings attached. In the
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middle exist the sort of projects that China and Colombia are currently developing, such
as Buenaventura, which involve significant investment without being inherently
burdensome. However, as Colombia continues to engage, the advantage begins to shift in
China’s favor, as accumulated debt will begin to provide further leverage in negotiations.
For all that it is not inherently burdensome in terms of debt, a massive project such as
Buenaventura, run by China in a country considered to be the strongest ally of the U.S. in
all of South America, could serve as a symbol for China’s increasing strength in the
region. The ultimate symbol of this would be Colombia’s joining the Belt and Road
Initiative; however, the fact that Colombia is willing to commit to such projects
demonstrates that the status quo of U.S. involvement may not serve as sufficient
deterrence to the mire of Chinese debt.
Further, turning to China demonstrates that Colombia is looking to diversify its
economic allies. Just last year, Colombia joined in a Chinese effort to create a
“multilateral financial cooperation mechanism” between Latin America and the Chinese
Development Bank.141 While granting contract after contract to Chinese firms signals that
Colombia is increasingly willing to work with China in its economic ventures, it also
serves to demonstrate that Colombia may be further from U.S. influence than previously
assumed.
As far as politics goes, however, Colombia seems hesitant to make any overture to
China direct enough that it would upset the U.S. and jeopardize that partnership. This
could put Colombia at odds with China, should the latter seek to disrupt the perception of
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U.S. hegemony in Latin America by damaging the connection between Colombia and the
U.S., but for the moment China seems to be working with Colombia in maintaining both
nations’ relationships with the U.S..
For the scope of China’s influence, there is potential for an interesting hybridization
of economic power from both the infrastructure and mineral arenas in Colombia. The
infrastructural economic power, like that seen with Ecuador in the previous case study,
would likely come from the Chinese Development Bank through the lending for the
development projects, while the mineral sector would see Sinochem and Sinopec as
providing economic leverage. For the purposes of determining the potential for influence,
it is not as important why these companies entered Colombia so much as what China is
willing to do with the power they have gathered while they are there. The costs, however,
would be what was lost in revenue, and the potential to lose a partner in Colombia should
China try and act in too heavy-handed a fashion.
As for Colombia, the availability of both mineral rights and lending projects is still
completely at the Colombian government’s discretion. Colombia holds the power to cut
China off from further investing in the land or infrastructure of their country, and since
Colombia lacks the level of indebtedness to China that many other Latin American have,
the long term consequence of such a choice would be much less damaging than if another
nation tried to the same.
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V.

Can China Advance Policy Goals in Colombia Through its
Economic Investment?
In a bargaining model such as that previously discussed for Colombia and China,

it is currently difficult for either nation to have too much of an advantage over the
other; neither has the leverage to force the other to comply, and the consequences of
walking away are relatively mild. However, the future might be a different animal
altogether. As Colombia becomes more open to Chinese investment and
development, it also raises the possibility of creating dependence on Chinese
financing such as that seen throughout much of the rest of the region.
Colombia is already beginning to accept more of China’s role in its economy,
albeit in a less direct way than a series of multibillion-dollar loan packages. Chinese
firms have begun entering the Colombian economy one after another. For instance,
last October, a Chinese-led consortium called Apca Transmimetro won the $4 billion
contract to build the Bogota metro line.142
The largest opportunity for China to use economics to gain influence in
Colombia, however, is through telecommunications. Chinese telecommunications
companies Huawei and ZTE both do significant business in Colombia, and both were
labeled potential security threats by the U.S. Government.143 Last year, ZTE
announced it had signed a 5-year deal with a Colombian university to “establish a 5G
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Joint Innovation Research Center in Colombia…both sides will be committed to
mutual educational and technological support while building up a cooperative
relationship in line with the framework initiatives of training, project development,
innovation, and technology.”144 The firm in question has already been accused of
repeatedly using its access to data and markets to provide the Chinese government
with a strategic advantage.145 As has been previously discussed, the unique legal
relationships Chinese firms have with their government makes it impossible to say
that any “private” firm will not act on behalf of the Chinese government when
asked.146 Should ZTE or Huawei be contracted to build Colombia’s 5G network, as
they have been for much of Colombia’s 4G network, China could gain more than just
an information advantage; it could gain the ability to pressure Colombia into an
agreement using data outages.
5G, though just one example of a possible Chinese entry into the vital systems of
Colombia’s economy, serves as an analogy of the potential of Chinese debt
diplomacy in the country as a whole. After initial Chinese investments, it simply
makes sense to continue with the systems that are already part of the country. As
those systems accumulate, the difficulty of replacing those systems with another
brand increases, and eventually becomes prohibitively expensive. It is simpler to
work with the systems already in place than try to start over, and so further
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expansions are negotiated through the proprietor of the existing systems. So, too, with
financing from China; the financing infrastructure is easier to maintain than shift, but
if Colombia is not careful, it will find China too expensive to replace.

Conclusion
China’s use of international aid as a tool to forward its global agenda is not
unique; there are numerous examples of nations doing the same, such as the U.S. in the
U.N. Security Council as noted by Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele. However, the use of
expansive non-concessionary lending in place of grants and concessionary lending to
gain diplomatic allies is a distinctly Chinese twist on the old practice. This evolution of
strategy brings with it new advantages, or new dangers, depending on your perspective.
Where the U.S. primarily uses grant money as an incentive, China has chosen to greatly
expand its non-concessionary funding as a means of inducement, as seen below in Figure
17. As China expanded into financing the developing world, its Official Developmental
Assistance (ODA), consisting of grants and concessionary loans, did not increase by a
large amount. Instead, the sharp increase in Other Official Flows (OOF) indicates the
dramatic increase in non-concessionary lending from China to developing nations. The
use of non-concessionary loans in place of concessionary loans and grants separates
China’s political aid from that of the U.S. and creates a new dynamic between lending
and developing nation.

Pendergrast 56
Figure 17: China’s Global Development (Billion USD) Source: AidData

China is seeking to use this dynamic to further its political goals in a manner that
leaves the debtor nation forced to choose between compliance and severe financial
distress. As Parker and Chefitz pointed out, China uses existing debt as an inducement in
itself, creating a political tool from the existence of debt alongside offering new financing
as an incentive. Of course, each additional loan shifts the status quo so that the debt is
more influential to a debtor nation’s decision making, thereby strengthening China’s
ability to request political and diplomatic concessions.
Furthermore, Beijing has greater flexibility regarding corruption and less than free
markets that allows for incentives to go directly to government officials. Many officials
in Ecuador responsible for approving and coordinating the Coca Codo Sinclair Dam
project were accused and sentenced on taking bribes, including a former vice president, a
former electricity minister, and even the former anti-corruption official in charge on
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monitoring the project. The anti-corruption officer was even recorded talking about
Chinese bribes.147 China uses its lax stance on corruption to its advantage by
incentivizing leaders to make financial decisions that may well not be in the best interests
of the countries they serve.
This willingness to bribe officials, combined with a large amount of lending China is
willing to provide, creates a very dangerous situation for developing nations looking for
nations where China is involved in development projects. The corruption of individuals
has the potential to mire a nation in debt, billions of dollars for investments that fail to
provide the revenue or growth promised, like Coca Codo Sinclair. Alternatively,
pressures coming from other sectors, such as minerals and energy in Colombia,
potentially provide an incentive to move forward with Chinese financing despite the
dangers demonstrated by neighboring countries.
The connection between Chinese firms and the goals of the Chinese Communist
Party, supported by Chinese law, gives China the ability to use foreign direct investment
as both an inducement in the negotiation of development projects and another type of
leverage after the firm is established within the nation. In Colombia, for example, the
Chinese presence in the mineral and energy sector is second only to that of the
Colombian government itself.148 This existing connection could be exploited to provide
officials with monetary compensation, pressure local governments into complying or
simply offer the ease of working with compatible firms. While this is not in itself
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https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/24/world/americas/ecuador-china-dam.html.
147

148

Pendergrast 58
threatening, the potential to shift the status quo beyond the point where Colombia can
somewhat comfortably walk away from Chinese investment is very real.
Additionally, the opaque nature of the loans and projects financed by China is
detrimental to both the nations involved and the global economic system as a whole.
Loans from China are often shrouded in secrecy, with terms and figures unavailable to
the public. Many analysts believe the true amounts of these loans to be higher than the
numbers that are officially tracked, resulting in so-called “hidden” debts that meet the
scrutiny of neither the public of the debtor government nor the international
community.149 As these debts expand, the public is left unaware of the extent of their
government’s indebtedness to China, and therefore has little ability to act in opposition
should they so desire.
On a geopolitical level, however, the consequences are potentially much more severe.
Growing debt burdens invisible to potential investors or organizations like the IMF can
easily lead to those groups underestimating the risk of lending money to countries with
Chinese debt. This lack of information means investors may believe nations to be more
solvent than they are, and provide loans at rates much lower than would be acceptable if
all the information was available, or purchase bonds believing the investment to be more
stable than it is.150
This, in turn, gives China another advantage over its debtor nations. Nations seeking
loans under such pretenses would not want potential investors to know the full extent of
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the nations’ indebtedness to China, as that information would cause funding to diminish
and interest rates to increase in response to a riskier lending situation. Therefore, China’s
information on such debts is another source of leverage, though the power of such a tool
would depend heavily on the degree of information asymmetry and China’s willingness
to reveal its thus far very private loan details. Though it is unlikely at the present, such a
possibility still holds power should China need leverage over one of its entrenched
debtors.
Essentially, what these factors add up to is China putting its thumb on the scale of
decision making in the countries with which it invests. Bit by bit, these influences
cumulate from a single project, to increasing loans, then finally to a debt trap. Ecuador
borrowed money hand over fist to finance development projects and quickly found itself
forced to decide between joining the Belt and Road Initiative and defaulting on its debts.
Colombia, more cautious in its approach, has seen a more gradual increase in Chinese
influence. From increasing Chinese involvement in the minerals sector, to development
projects like Buenaventura funded by the Chinese Development Bank, and finally
working with China to install the next generation of communications infrastructure while
expanding Chinese involvement in infrastructure projects as a whole. Every step tips the
scales a little further, and a slight concession has the potential to snowball into a debt
trap.
However, Colombia falling into a debt trap is by no means a foregone conclusion.
As of now, Colombia still holds a powerful position in its bargains with China and,
having seen the examples set by Ecuador and other nations caught in China’s debt trap,
Colombia may choose to proceed with caution. Further, China’s deliberate use of debt as
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a trapping mechanism could lead to long term consequences for the lending giant, such as
a lack of faith in China’s intentions along with nations potentially giving up on paying
what they see as, and what very well may be, an inescapable debt.
Chinese firms, though not the agents of trapping nations in debt, have earned their
title of accomplice. Projects extended well beyond deadlines, or of poor quality such as
Coca Codo Sinclair, are expensive for host nations to clean up and do not help assuage
doubts of poor workmanship and ulterior motives. For a while, China might end up with
everything it wants from these nations, and having them come time and again to
renegotiate debts gives China the potential to ask a lot of any and all of them. However,
such tactics only hold their power while a nation is unwilling to face the consequences of
walking away; if a nation is pushed too far, or China miscalculates the pressure needed to
attain one of its political goals, it could very quickly find itself left with no one to
pressure at all.
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